Employment at a multinational enterprise (MNE) responds to wages at the extensive margin, when an MNE expands abroad, and at the intensive margin, when an MNE operates existing affiliates. We present an MNE model and conditions for parametric and nonparametric identification. Prior studies rarely found wages to affect MNE employment. We detect salient adjustments at both margins for German manufacturing MNEs. With a one-percent increase in home wages, for instance, MNEs add 2,000 jobs in Eastern Europe at the extensive margin and 4,000 jobs overall; a converse one-percent drop in Eastern European wages removes 730 German MNE jobs.
Introduction
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are important mediators of world trade.
1 Surprisingly, however, their operation has rarely been found to strongly affect factor demands across locations.
2
We study how MNEs organize their global activity and the employment consequences at two critical margins. An MNE's labor demand responds to international wage differentials at the extensive margin, when the MNE expands into a foreign market, and at the intensive margin, when the MNE operates existing affiliates. Our empirical analysis shows that MNEs change their foreign presence only infrequently, but that these scant changes are associated with salient employment shifts. In most locations, the extensive-margin response to permanent wage differentials is about as large as intensive-margin adjustment and has considerable consequences for overall factor demand.
We present a generic MNE model that encompasses motives for both vertical and horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI) and derive a simple estimation framework that accounts for the MNE's regional configuration at both margins. The model offers an integration of two strands of the empirical literature-one on MNEs' location choices and one on MNE operations across existing locations-into a unified procedure.
3
Aside from the economic importance of the extensive margin, estimates at the intensive margin are subject to selectivity bias unless corrected. Using comprehensive data on German manufacturing MNEs and their majority-owned foreign manufacturing affiliates, we find that the elasticities of labor substitution are simultaneously under-estimated for some and over-estimated for other locations unless corrected for the extensive margin. Our estimators extend the univariate sample selection case to one of multiple selections and outcomes. With an eye on ease of implementation, we present conditions under which common Heckman (1979) correction and straightforward nonparametric estimation (similar to Das, Newey and Vella 2003) can be applied location by location and integrated into outcome estimation-in our case a seemingly unrelated equation system of the MNE's labor demands.
4
Beyond our application, the estimation technique potentially applies to 1 The world's ten largest MNEs in 2000 produce almost one percent of world GDP, and the one hundred largest MNEs are responsible for more than four percent of world GDP (UNCTAD press release TAD/INF/PR/47, 12/08/02).
2 See e.g. Slaughter (2000) for U.S. and Konings (2004) for European MNEs.
3 Among the studies in the former literature are Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Head and Mayer (2004) who research MNEs' location choices. Slaughter (2000) , Head and Ries (2002) and Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2005) , for instance, analyze MNE operations across existing locations in the latter literature.
4 For consumer demand, there are three main estimation procedures to account for the extensive margin (non-zero demand) and the intensive margin (quantity): Amemiya's (1974) censored system, the primal Kuhn-Tucker approach of Wales and Woodland (1983) , and the dual shadow-price approach of Lee and Pitt (1986) . As Haefen, Phaneuf and Parsons (2004) remark, most empirical models of consumer demand for multiple goods have relied on the discrete-choice random-utility maximization model (i.e. the extensive margin only). Consumer-demand studies that account for empirical work on extensive margins in international trade models, such as exportmarket entry, import-market access, or intra-firm trade.
At the extensive margin, several firm-level studies do not find wages or per-capita incomes to be significant predictors of location choice (e.g. Devereux and Griffith (1998) for U.S., Buch, Kleinert, Lipponer and Toubal (2005) for German MNEs).
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Multinomial logit estimation turns wages into significant predictors of location choice in Disdier and Mayer (2004) for French MNEs, and in Becker, Ekholm, Jäckle and Muendler (2005) for Swedish MNEs and the same German MNE sample as in this paper. But multinomial logit requires mutually exclusive location choices so that the simultaneous presence of MNEs in several locations needs to rest on the assumption of independent decisions, which is not necessarily compatible with MNE-wide profit maximization. In contrast, we condition on an MNE's past presence and its interaction with wages and find wage variables to be statistically significant predictors of location choices in several probit and nonparametric selection regressions, while allowing for correlated decisions. Moreover, our model suggests that the wage impact on location selection should be weighted with the impact of location selection on employment to arrive at the wage effect on an MNE's regional configuration. Doing so shows that wage differentials across locations are substantial predictors of labor substitution within MNEs at the extensive margin.
For the intensive margin, Slaughter (2000) reports that operations in low-wage locations have no detectable impact on relative home employment at U.S. MNEs. Similar to the U.S. evidence, Braconier and Ekholm (2000) , Konings (2004) and Marin (2004) find little or no evidence that operations of European MNEs in lowwage locations have an impact on home employment. In contrast to the MNE evidence, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) attributed about a third of U.S. relative wage changes to cross-border outsourcing at the sector level, within MNEs or across firms.
both interior and corner solutions (intensive and extensive margins) have focused on computationally feasible estimation techniques that circumvent the curse of dimensionality associated with primal and dual approaches (Meyerhoefer, Ranney and Sahn 2005) . Estimators on the basis of Amemiya (1974) are common. In recent work, Meyerhoefer et al. (2005) derive a two-step estimator for demand panel data using a linear projection of the heteroskedastic error component on observables. Yen and Lin (2006) generalize Heckman (1979) to a maximum likelihood (ML) estimator for censored demand systems under normality. We present a plausible set of conditions under which an extension of the Heckman two-step estimator is justified instead of ML, and cannot reject the conditions in our MNE sample. We also present assumptions that permit a nonparametric estimator that generalizes Das et al. (2003) and does not require distributional assumptions while accounting for heteroskedastic error components. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2007) conduct selectivity correction in the context of country-level bilateral trade flows under the assumption of uncorrelated selection choices; they find the selection bias in bilateral trade to be empirically small, in contrast to MNE expansions in the present paper. 5 Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) find evidence in aggregate data that relatively abundant high-skilled labor is a significant predictor of foreign direct investment (FDI) of U.S. MNEs; and Blonigen, Davies and Head (2003) find that larger skill differentials predict less foreign MNE activity.
For Japanese MNEs, Head and Mayer (2004) report that foreign employment in low-income countries does relate to more skill-intensive employment at home. Using additional evidence on U.S. MNEs, Harrison and McMillan (2006) show that foreign employment substitutes for U.S. MNE employment in industries with no significant intra-firm trade, whereas foreign employment in low-income countries complements U.S. employment in industries with significant intra-firm trade, so that the net employment effect is small at the intensive margin.
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When an MNE relocates a production stage that is complementary at the intensive margin, however, job loss can still result at the extensive margin.
7
A separate literature on MNEs compares MNE performance to that of national firms with no foreign affiliates and typically finds no clear difference in behavior between MNEs and non-MNEs at the firm level (Egger and Pfaffermayr 2003 , Barba Navaretti and Castellani 2004 , Jäckle 2006 , with few exceptions (Debaere, Lee and Lee 2006) . Linking the German MNE data to employee information at the job level, Becker and Muendler (forthcoming) find that expanding MNEs retain more domestic jobs than competitors without foreign expansions-consistent with the idea that curtailing MNE expansions could lead to further domestic job loss. While important for economic policy, comparisons between MNEs and non-MNEs at any level do not address whether home and foreign employment are complements or substitutes within the MNE. Measurement of well defined constant-output cross-price elasticities of substitution requires conditioning on output, contrary to comparison studies where performance varies by design.
We find cross-wage elasticities at both margins to be strictly positive. So, home and foreign employment are substitutes within MNEs not only at the intensive but also at the extensive margin.
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Elasticities at the extensive margin are about half the size of elasticities at the intensive margin in locations close to home. For overseas developing countries, however, elasticities are significantly different from zero only at the extensive margin. Bootstrapped standard errors reject equality between the intensive and the total elasticity of substitution for most locations, corroborating the importance of the extensive margin. Elasticity point estimates at both margins are robust across different samples and wage data, model and correlation specifications, and parametric and nonparametric estimation techniques.
We evaluate the counterfactual question how many jobs MNEs would reallocate in response to shrinking wage differentials. A one-percent drop in German wages relative to the sample-mean level would reduce MNE employment in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) by around 4,000 jobs overall, for instance. Similarly, a onepercent increase in CEE wages would bring 730 jobs to Germany. These are sizeable figures. Wages in CEE are, on average, about 10 percent of the German level in 2000. If the estimated elasticities of substitution were constant at all wage levels, an increase in CEE wages by 450% to cut the wage gap to Germany in half would bring 330,000 (= 730 · 450) counterfactual manufacturing jobs to Germany-about a quarter of the estimated home employment at German manufacturing MNEs.
9
Of course, elasticities of substitution are not constant at all wage levels so that the counterfactual prediction is crude. We nevertheless view the magnitude as indicative of the potential importance of multinational labor substitution. This paper has four more sections. In Section 2, we present a model of the expansion and operation of MNEs and derive identification conditions for estimation under location selectivity. Section 3 discusses the data and descriptive statistics on location choice. Estimation results on multinational labor substitution are presented in Section 4, and interpreted in counterfactual evaluations. Section 5 concludes.
Multinational Expansion and Operation
There are L locations for production and sales. In period t, MNE j produces up to L location-specific outputs q jt with quasi-fixed capital k jt under variable-input costs w t . Production technology is assumed to be the same for all MNEs. We specify the short-run cost function C(q jt ; k jt , w t ) to be a multiproduct translog function with well-defined elasticities of labor substitution.
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An MNE's choice of activity is a two-stage decision problem. At time t − τ , that is τ periods prior to production and sales, the MNE selects its locations and capital inputs k jt . The MNE faces uncertainty over its competitors' future outputs q i =j,t , input prices w t , and its own realized output q jt . On the second stage at time t, MNE j chooses output q jt and variable factor inputs.
9 If international wage gaps shrink at a similar rate as per capita GDP converges to steady state and Germany is close to its steady state, the CEE-German wage gap would take around 35 years to contract to half its present size (Barro and Sala i Martin 1992) . 10 We adopt the Brown and Christensen (1981, eq. 10 .21) short-run version of the Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973) translog cost function and extend the specification to multiple products (Appendix A). A main alternative would be Hall's (1973) generalization of the Diewert (1971) Leontief cost function to the multiproduct case. We favor the translog cost function because it is parsimonious. We choose a short-run function because our location-selectivity estimation captures long-term installation costs and because observed capital inputs are arguably closer proxies to MNE-specific user costs of capital than price measures.
The intensive and extensive margins
At the intensive margin, the MNE operates its established affiliates across locations. Its labor demand at location is
by Shepard's lemma. The 3L-vector x jt is a monotonic and MNE-specific transformation of the cost-function arguments (q jt , k jt , w t ), consistent with the multiproduct translog cost function. At the extensive margin, the MNE's selection of a location at time t − τ has an expected impact on labor demand at time t:
where jt is the unobserved labor-demand effect of location selection. The binary indicator d jt denotes presence at location . The predictors for location choice z j,t−τ are in the firm's information set at t − τ and include, among other variables, past presence indicators d j,t−τ and wages w t−τ around the world. Observed employment at location is the sum of labor demand at the intensive margin (1) and the extensive margin (2). The extensive margin follows from a general model of the firm's multinational location choices. A profit-maximizing firm is present at location with a foreign affiliate iff the expected profit difference between presence and absence strictly exceeds the sunk costs of presence
where H(z j,t−τ ) is the expected net profit from producing at , which equals the sum of expected revenues p q , * jt from producing at and the expected cost savings from producing at , less the sunk cost of producing at .
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This general first-order condition encompasses motives for both horizontal and vertical FDI, which may overlap in practice (Feinberg and Keane 2006) .
The sunk costs of presence at location have an observable component F j,t−τ and an unobservable firm-specific component η j,t−τ . Given fixed entry costs γ N and fixed exit costs γ X , the costs of changing presence at location are
So, the decision-relevant sunk cost of presence at is a function of past presence:
where (γ X + γ N ) is also called the hysteresis band. It reflects the sunk costs that induce firms with a presence to continue operations at location (Dixit 1989 ).
To express extensive-margin labor demand (2) in terms of location determinants, consider the propensity Pr jt for firm j to be present at . The propensity Pr jt is the conditional expectation of (3),
where F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of η j,t−τ . Assuming that F (·) is one-to-one and changing variables with u jt ≡ 1−F (η j,t−τ ), labor demand at the extensive margin can be expressed as
So, extensive-margin labor demand at location depends only on the propensity score for that location and the pattern of presence elsewhere. Conditional on an MNE's presence at location , overall employment at location is thereforē
The regressors x jt include (a transformation of) the current wages w n t , and the selection predictors z j,t−τ contain the past wages w n t−τ at locations n = 1, . . . , L. So, a permanent wage change at location n results in an overall labor-demand response at location by
Expressions (6) and (7) clarify that estimators for one margin at a time can fail to detect the correct magnitude of employment responses to international wage differences for at least two reasons. First, eq. (6) shows that β coefficients at the intensive margin are not well estimated unless the unobserved error component m (·) is controlled for. In our data, the home-employment elasticity of substitution with respect to foreign wages is both under-estimated by up to 26 percent (developingcountry wage effects at the intensive margin) and over-estimated by up to .6 percent (Eastern-European wage effects) in the absence of a correction for the extensive margin. Second, eq. (7) shows that estimates of propensity changes in response to wage levels ∂ Pr jt /∂w n t−τ measure only a part of the extensive margin's importance for outcomes. Similar to earlier findings, our data exhibit only a weak association between wage levels and location decisions. This is consistent with high sunk cost that make extensive-margin adjustments infrequent and hard to measure. But, once appropriately weighted with the associated employment response ∂y ext, jt /∂ Pr jt , wage changes at the extensive margin are found to have an economically and statistically highly significant impact that is about as large as intensive-margin adjustment.
Estimators
The MNE model has L − 1 location-selection equations (3) because presence at home cannot be estimated in a data set for a single country's MNEs. The model has L − 1 outcome equations (6) because the cost function is homogeneous of degree one in wages and hence one labor-demand equation becomes redundant (we omit the home labor-demand equation). Denoting home with = 1, the estimation model is therefore
Different functional forms can be specified for H(z j,t−τ ), and alternative distributional assumptions can be placed on η j,t−τ and jt . We consider three sets of assumptions: (1) a parametric version with linear H(·) and joint normality of η j,t−τ and jt ; (2) a nonparametric version for some smooth function H(·) and arbitrarily distributed η j,t−τ and jt ; (3) a nonparametric version for some smooth function H(·) and independent η n j,t−τ and jt for n = .
Labor demand. Labor-demand estimation is similar under all three sets of assumptions. A short-run multiproduct translog cost function implies that a location's wage-bill share s jt ≡ w t y jt /C jt is a function of q jt , k jt , and w t (see Appendix A). Translog demand systems are often estimated with cost shares s jt as dependent variables. Instead, we multiply the wage bill shares s jt with observation-specific scalars C jt /w t to arrive at transformed outcome equations
The transformation has three important advantages. First, there is no constant term among the regressors x jt so that lacking identification of the constant in a nonparametric selection correction is no concern. Second, wages become regressors only and do not enter the dependent variable. Third, labor demand is not bounded above so that, conditional on x jt , the labor demand disturbance satisfies the assumption of one-sided censoring for selectivity correction. Equation (8) requires treatment for locations of absence where zero output and zero inputs occur.
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Our maintained assumptions imply that stacking of observations is a viable and attractive procedure.
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Stacking is easily implemented, improves efficiency, collapses the up to 2 L−1 − 1 sets of estimates into one consistently estimated (L−1)-equation system, and provides a single L × L matrix of estimates for wage elasticities of regional labor demands. Stacking interacts the parameters in (8) with presence indicators: µ n = 0 when no output is produced at location n, and κ n = δ n = 0 when MNE j employs no factors at location n. Stacking is permissible under three natural assumptions in our framework: (i) all MNEs face the same sunk cost function F j,t−τ conditional on prior presence (so that presence is mean independent of inputs); (ii) MNEs face an identical short-run cost function C(·) in all locations of presence (but not necessarily where absent) conditional on characteristics (so that a common parameter vector is justified); and (iii) the disturbances Parametric location selection (Assumption 1). Given our parametric cost function, a parametric approach to selectivity is a natural benchmark. Plausible distributional assumptions permit individual Heckman (1979) corrections location by location. 14 Consider linear selection predictions H(z j,t−τ ) = z j,t−τ γ and jointly normally distributed disturbances ( k jt , η j,t−τ ) so that a probit model describes the choice of presence (3).
The correlation between n jt and η j,t−τ across separate locations n = is crucial for estimation of outcomes (8). Our data reject independence of n jt and η j,t−τ .
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12 Of course, estimation of separate equation systems for every possible presence pattern is a possibility. The resulting estimators are hard to interpret, however, and plagued by dimensionality: potential presence in up to L − 1 locations outside home implies that there are up to 2 L−1 − 1 regional presence patterns. In our sample, only 57 out of 1,770 MNEs are omnipresent in all four world regions in 2000, and every single one of the 15 possible regional presence pattern occurs.
13 Lee and Pitt (1986) propose an estimator related to Neary and Roberts's (1980) shadow price approach. Koebel (2006) conducts Box-Cox transformations on inputs.
14 For multivariate selectivity, an extension of the univariate Heckman (1979) estimator has a complicated form (conditional moments of multivariate normal distributions have no known closed form for multiple truncations). Simulated maximum-likelihood would be a viable technique but requires joint multivariate normality, which we prefer to relax in nonparametric estimation.
15 SUR estimation of the outcome equations shows that n jt and jt correlate so that n jt and η j,t−τ
To specify the correlation structure, we depart from the idea that selection disturbances include both location-specific parts such as, for example, surprising changes to profit repatriation policies in the host country and include MNE-specific parts such as idiosyncratic shocks to a firm's sunk entry costs. Changes to host-country repatriation policies affect the entry decision. But once the MNE operates in the host country, it minimizes costs irrespective of entry-related host-country shocks. So, we consider it plausible to assume that there is an MNE-specific component e jt to the selection shock η n j,t−τ and that the labor-demand shock jt correlates with the selection shock η n j,t−τ elsewhere only through the MNE-specific component e jt . The assumption is not rejected in our data. Note that, under this assumption, cost function disturbances do covary with entry shocks across locations, but only through an MNE-specific component. . And the covariances between the selection shock in location n and the demand shock in location are σ n η = λ. So, cost function disturbances do correlate with entry-relevant policy shocks between locations, but only through an MNE-specific shock. The assumption accommodates potential serial correlation in location selection, defining u jt ≡ ς α u ςũ j,t−ς . Assumption 1 is testable. We obtain estimates of σ n η = 1−ω from multivariate probit estimation and use a χ 2 -test for their equality. We fail to reject equality.
Intuitively, all selection-related information that is relevant for labor demand at any location is fully contained in the single presence indicator d jt , which is as informative about η j,t−τ as any other location indicator. So, location-by-location correction for selectivity is permissible. Proof. Under Assumption 1, the marginal likelihood function is
must be correlated because jt and η j,t−τ are correlated by assumption.
after concentrating out u jt and v jt , where σ = σ = λ 2 + (π ) 2 and ρ η = σ η /σ = λ/ λ 2 + (π ) 2 . φ(·) and Φ(·) are the standard normal density and distribution functions. This is the likelihood function for independent Heckman (1979) correction location by location, where extensive-margin labor demand becomes m Pr (z j,t−τ ) = β Λ Λ jt (z j,t−τ γ ) and β Λ = ρ η σ is the coefficient on the selectivity hazard Λ jt (z j,t−τ γ ) (the inverse of the Mills ratio) in the outcome equation.
Nonparametric location selection (Assumption 2). Under nonparametric selectivity correction, no distributional assumptions need to be placed on η j,t−τ or jt , and H(·) can be any smooth function. We augment the nonparametric singleoutcome model with multiple thresholds in Das et al. (2003) to multivariate binary selection and multiple outcomes. A sufficient identifying assumption is stated in Appendix B, where we also provide a proof of identification (Lemma 2). We base sufficiency for identification on three conditions. First, the conditional expectation of the labor demand disturbance is as eq. (5) states. Second, at least one predictor of the propensity score is not also a predictor of the labor-demand outcome. Third, the regressors in the information set at t − τ predict the propensity score. Note that these three conditions allow us to relax the earlier identifying assumption that ( n jt , η j,t−τ ) is independent of x m jt and z j,t−τ for all , m, n. The new set of assumptions only requires that, conditional on the propensity score Pr jt , jt is uncorrelated with all functions of x jt and z j,t−τ . Moreover, the nonparametric estimator allows for conditional heteroskedasticity of unknown form (and thus presents a nonparametric alternative to Chen and Khan's (2003) three-step estimator). This makes nonparametric analysis a powerful tool for multivariate binary selection estimation.This makes nonparametric analysis a powerful tool for multivariate binary selection estimation. We use power series to approximate Pr (z j,t−τ ) and m (Pr jt , d n = jt ). Power series are root-n asymptotic normal and can estimate smooth functionals of unknown parameters (Newey 1997) . Most important for our application, the first derivative of the power series estimator is a smooth functional and hence also root-n asymptotic normal.
Nonparametric location selection with cross-equation independence (Assumption 3). For a final robustness assessment, we specify a more restrictive set of identifying conditions. Suppose that η j,t−τ and n jt are mean independent for n = , conditional on observable decision variables. Then the MNE's location decision is independent of expected labor-demand outcomes at other locations and an accordingly extended definition of the extensive margin isȳ
which does not condition on the observed location pattern outside . See Appendix C for a proof (Lemma 3). The resulting specification of the extensive margin implies that a permanent wage differential (in z j,t−τ ) may affect the entire grid of an MNE's potential locations. Formally, we now evaluate ∇ P jt m (P jt ) · ∇ z j,t−τ P jt (a matrix), where P jt is the vector of propensity scores.
The cost-function estimates themselves are hard to interpret. We therefore report all results in terms of elasticities of substitution.
Elasticities
Elasticities of substitution quantify the response of labor demand y jt to permanent wage changes. Our model of the MNE, and the above three estimators, allow us to derive the constant-output cross-price elasticity of substitution between factors and n.
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The cross-price elasticity of substitution is defined as ε n ≡ ∂ ln y jt /∂ ln w n and becomes
for a short-run translog cost function, where s = w y /C is the wage bill share of the workforce at (the wage bill at location in the MNE's total wage bill).
A permanent change of the wage level w n at location n is reflected in both vectors of regressors x jt (with w n t ) and z j,t−τ (with w n t−τ ). So, the marginal response of the wage bill share s jt to a permanent change in ln w
The first term in (10) captures the labor demand response at the intensive margin, where δ n is the regression coefficient on the transformed wage in eq. (8). The second term in (10) is a measure of the labor demand response to a permanent change in w n at the extensive margin. The extensive-margin estimate is multiplied by the present wage w n t because estimation on the first stage uses w n t as regressors, not their logs. Division by C/w t converts estimates from the transformed labor demand eq. (8) back into their wage bill share equivalents.
Under Heckman (1979) correction (Assumption 1), the extensive-margin term in (10) simplifies to β Λ ∆ jt · γ w n · w t w n t /C, where γ w n is the wage coefficient in the selection equation, β Λ is the coefficient on the selectivity hazard in the outcome equation, and ∆ jt is the first derivative of the selectivity hazard Λ jt (the inverse of the Mills ratio) with respect to its argument,
Because ∆ j (·) ∈ (0, 1), the sign of the log wage effect on the wage bill at the extensive margin is the sign of the product γ w n β Λ (the coefficients on the two stages of estimation). Under nonparametric location selection (Assumption 2) and polynomial series estimation, the derivatives of m (·) and Pr jt at the extensive margin are the marginal effects on the polynomial terms, evaluated at the sample mean. Under nonparametric location selection with cross-equation independence (Assumption 3), the extensive-margin term is generalized to ∇ P jt m (P jt ) · ∇ w n t−τ P jt · w t w n t /C, and we evaluate the marginal effects at the sample mean.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our principal data source is a confidential three-dimensional panel data set of German MNEs (parent-affiliate-year observations), collected by Deutsche Bundesbank (BuBa). We restrict the sample to manufacturing parents and manufacturing affiliates between 1996 and 2001, and retain only majority-owned affiliates because a multi-location cost function suggests that parent firms have full managerial control.
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We transform the data to parent-location-year observations, deflate the data with location-specific CPIs, convert foreign-currency values to their EUR equivalents in December 1998 (the sample mid point) to remove nominal exchange rate fluctuations, and combine the data with complementary information on wages and host-country characteristics from various sources. Details on currency conversion and the complementary host-country data are in the Appendix.
MNE data
For foreign affiliates, we obtain information on turnover, employment and fixed assets from BuBa's midi database (MIcro database Direct Investment, formerly direk). midi contains outward FDI information from a legally mandated annual sur- vey that covers the universe of German firms and households with foreign corporate holdings above minimum ownership shares and capital stock thresholds (Lipponer 2003) . Individually identified outward FDI data are available since 1996 and provide two-digit NACE 1.1 sector classifications for the parent and affiliates.
For German parent firms, information on balance sheets and income statements comes from BuBa's ustan database (Deutsche Bundesbank 1998), which records firms that draw a bill of exchange. The bill of exchange is a common form of payment among firms of all sizes throughout the sample period 1996-2001 (though losing popularity thereafter). ustan is considered the most comprehensive source of balance sheet data for companies of all sizes outside the financial sector in Germany. The midi and ustan data were linked by parent name and address in previous work (Becker et al. 2005) , resulting in the loss of some observations from the universe.
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To reduce dimensionality, we lump host countries into four aggregate locations: CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), and WEU (Western Europe), beyond the home location Germany (see Table 14 for definitions). Aggregation into four foreign locations beyond home reduces the estimated cross-wage labor demand elasticity matrix to five columns and rows (with 25 elasticity estimates). Except perhaps for DEV, which spans developing countries in Africa, Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region, aggregate locations are fairly homogeneous. As Table 1 shows, the four foreign regions host similarly large manufacturing workforces for German manufacturing MNEs: between 250,000 and 400,000 employees. Among the low-wage locations we focus on CEE where most expansions happen. For the 2,247 midi MNEs with foreign presence either in 1996 or 2000, CEE was the region where MNEs opened most new affiliates, 18.2 percent more in 2000 than in 1996, followed by DEV with a 12.6 percent increase, OIN with 3.2 percent and WEU with 2.0 percent. We estimate that German manufacturing MNEs with majority-owned foreign manufacturing affiliates employ about 1.4 million German workers in 2000, including their predicted out-ofsample employment.
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The largest employment per MNE occurs in OIN and the smallest employment in WEU.
The data exhibit strikingly rare changes to foreign presence, consistent with considerable sunk cost of entry and exit. Table 2 shows changes to foreign presence between 1996 and 2000. Large-font entries are for firms that are MNEs in both years, small-font entries include non-MNEs. Out of five MNEs with two locations (home and one foreign location) in 1996 more than four keep exactly two locations (large-font entries in row 2). A similar pattern holds for any multiple-location MNE: entries along the diagonal exhibit the highest frequency in every row and every column. Regional expansions are gradual: the frequencies above the diagonal decrease monotonically in every row. Regional exits, however, are not generally gradual: MNEs who exit most frequently abandon all foreign locations at once; frequencies in the first column dominate frequencies below the diagonal in the third and fifth row (small-font entries in column 1). There is a remarkable number of complete withdrawals between 1996 and 2000 (477 out of 2,247 MNEs), but most of those withdrawers were present in only one foreign location in 1996 (365 out of 477). Note that the midi data cover the universe of German firms with FDI above minimum thresholds, and sample attrition is mitigated by the legal obligation to report and BuBa's commitment to follow up on missing questionnaires. To arrive at an empirically meaningful definition of the extensive margin, we query the number of affiliates and countries that are involved in changes to foreign presence. German MNEs typically pursue a single-affiliate strategy of foreign presence: the median number of affiliates per location is one. Table 3 shows that, once an MNE has established its presence in a given location with at least one affiliate, the number of affiliates hardly changes: 859 out of 1,259 MNE observations in given locations exhibit no change to the number of affiliates between 1996 and 2000; 247 out of 1,259 MNEs increase or decrease the number of affiliates by one. A small remainder of 153 parents chooses to change the number of affiliates by more. (The MNE total in Table 3 is smaller than that in Table 2 because we condition on presence in a location.) Changes to the number of host countries within locations are even less frequent than changes to the number of affiliates: an analysis of host country changes similar to Table 3 shows that 947 out of 1,259 observations of MNEs exhibit no change in the number of selected host countries within the location.
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Motivated by these findings, we define the extensive margin (selection into a location) as the presence of an MNE in an aggregate location with at least one affiliate.
Wage data
Affiliate-wage information is not reported in midi. Though German parent-wages would be available from ustan, we take German wages from the same outside sources as affiliate wages for comparability. For our main analysis, we use manufacturing wages by country and sector for 1996 through 2001 from the unido Industrial Statistics Database at the 3-digit ISIC level (dividing sectoral wage bills by employment). We also report robustness checks using oww wage data by occupation (Occupational Wages around the World, Freeman and Oostendorp 2001) .
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Appendix D.2 provides details on the wage data sources. We construct different wage regressors for the two margins to address econometric concerns.
For intensive-margin labor-demand estimation on the second stage, we use median wages over sectors by country. The median mitigates possible sectoral workforce composition effects behind local wages. Concretely, we take the arithmetic mean over the sector-median wages across the foreign countries where the MNE is present in a given year, and we take Germany-wide sector medians of the home wages by year. These wages are close to the MNE's effective labor costs at the intensive margin.
For extensive-margin estimation on the first stage, of course, wage variables must not depend on an MNE's country selection. Moreover, foreign wages are locationspecific attributes and would therefore not be identified for the cross section of MNEs in binomial choice models. To rely less on time variation, we make our foreignwage variables (sector-median wages by country) MNE-specific. We take competitor averages for every MNE over the foreign wages that the MNE's competitors pay.
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22 Infrequent net changes to the number of affiliates and countries could, in principle, conceal gross alternations such as changes to the country composition within a location or exit and reentry with a different affiliate. The data show that only small shares of MNEs that maintain a constant number of affiliates within a location change countries. In both CEE and WEU 4.2 percent of MNEs with constant affiliate numbers between 1996 and 2000 change host country, and 7.2 percent of the MNEs with constant affiliate numbers in DEV change country, but none do so in OIN. Similarly small fractions are associated with changing affiliate IDs, suggesting that the few gross alternations beyond net changes are mostly country changes and not reentries with different affiliates. 23 We report additional robustness checks with ubs wage data in the working paper version. Results vary little with different wage data.
24 We consider only competitors within an MNE's manufacturing sector. The eight sectors are: food; textiles and leather; wood, pulp and paper; chemicals, rubber, plastic and energy producing materials; mineral and metal products; machinery and equipment; transport equipment; and manufactures not elsewhere classified. The wage at t − τ in CEE, for example, is the average wage paid at competitors' affiliates in CEE. Competitors' labor costs abroad are arguably among the important decision variables for an MNE's location choice. We apply the same procedure to all other host-country characteristics. For the annual home wage, we use sectormean wages because wage variables that reflect the workforce composition are valid predictors at the extensive margin. 
Estimation sample
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In our main estimation specification, we will consider multinational labor demand during the years 1998-2001 (called t) for a sample of 1,640 MNEs and infer their location selection two years prior to production (t − τ ) from an uncensored sample of 3,392 MNEs during the years 1996-1999 (called t−τ ).
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For robustness checks, we will also use a single cross-section of 322 MNEs in 2000 and their location selection in 1996. The frequency of MNE presence abroad increases by two to four percentage points between 1996-99 and 1998-2001 in all locations but WEU (Western European countries), where it slightly falls in the censored panel.
German MNEs spend the bulk of their wage bill (79 percent) at home, because German wages and German employment are relatively high compared to foreign locations. From German MNEs, CEE receives labor expenditures beyond the remaining developing world combined. (Note that shares do not add to unity across columns because averages are conditional on presence, omitting absent MNEs). A similar cross-location pattern arises for turnover and capital stocks. Substantial wage disparities persist across locations. Between Germany and CEE, for instance, MNE wages differ by 2.1 log points, or a factor of around 800 percent (exp{10.360 − 8.286} = 8.0 for 1998-2001). This MNE-level difference is smaller, however, than the country-population weighted wage gap of about 1,000 percent (1/.099) in the raw unido wage data in 2000. The smaller conditional differential is consistent with MNE selection into relative high-wage countries within the low-wage region CEE (Marin 2004) .
German MNEs in CEE, compared to any other location, face competitors in host countries that offer the least market access, that have the smallest skill endowments, that are geographically the closest and that exhibit the smallest per-capita consumption. The CEE wages paid by German competitors of MNEs in CEE are below those paid by German competitors in DEV. MNEs in OIN, at the other extreme, face German competitors with the strongest host-country market access and host-country skill endowments.
Parent-level covariates are suggestive of selectivity effects at their means. Parents with headquarters in East Germany (including Berlin) are slightly more likely to expand to CEE and OIN than the average German MNE. For all other parent-firm regressors, regional conditional means (columns 2 to 5) exceed the unconditional mean (column 1), and regional means tend to be the lower the higher the frequency of MNE presence. Conditional on their presence abroad, MNEs exhibit larger home workforces, larger parent-firm equity or debt, and higher parent-firm capital-labor ratios.
Estimation
We estimate the MNE model-selection equations (3) and outcomes (8)-for all locations under Assumptions 1 through 3. Both exclusion restrictions and timing provide identification.
Identification
The labor-demand outcome on the second stage is separately identified from location selection on the first stage because the MNE chooses current-period output, employment and capital in response to news after location choice, whereas locationentry estimation is based on past information and a separate set of parent-firm and competitor-level variables. Location selection on the first stage is separately identified from labor demand on the second stage because parent-firm variables and competitor-level host-country attributes at decision time are among the predictors of future presence but not directly relevant for operation at the section stage other then through the propensity of presence.
Unobserved MNE heterogeneity is a concern but mitigated in our framework and data. We include a large set of time-varying parent-level variables in selection estimation on the first stage-among them MNE size, financial measures and productivity-related variables such as profits per equity. On the second stage, inverse Mills ratios or nonparametric propensities of foreign presence control for heterogeneity and the MNEs' motives to conduct FDI. Remaining unobserved MNE-specific performance advantages would cause domestic and foreign employment to expand simultaneously and suggest a bias of labor-demand elasticity estimates towards complementarity, but we will consistently find cross-regional substitutability.
Serial correlation in the selection disturbance could contribute to the observed hysteresis of foreign presence. We therefore perform estimation under varying assumptions on serial correlation and consider different time horizons of location selection: pooled MNE cross sections with two-year selection-outcome lags are our benchmark, and a single cross-section of location selection with a four-year lag is a main comparison regression. We find that labor demand elasticities remain largely the same across different serial-correlation specifications and time horizons.
Home-wage effects on multinational employment are identified at both margins from cross-sectoral variation because individual wage-taking firms face bargained wage schedules from sector-specific agreements between German unions and employer associations.
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Time variation in home wages provides additional identification. Foreign wages are based on country-wide sector medians. For selection estimation, our foreign-wage regressors are competitor-level variables in the MNE cross section, and time variation provides additional variation. For labor demand estimation, foreign wage effects are identified in the MNE cross section because actual foreign wage payments vary dependent on the MNE's country composition within foreign locations, and time variation provides additional variation.
Location choice
We first estimate location-selection equations (3)
Probit estimation. For probit estimation, we start by investigating the implication of Assumption 1 that the selection-shock covariances between locations are constant for all locations. We obtain estimates for the covariances from multivariate probit estimation of simultaneous selection into the four foreign locations (on the same set of regressors as in Table 5 ). We fail to reject joint equality of the six correlation coefficients between the four equations with a χ 2 test statistic of 4.63 (p value .592).
The plausibility of Assumption 1 verified, we turn to probit estimation location by location and investigate alternative specifications for serial correlation.
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To pick the serial-correlation specification with most empirical support, we apply the Pan (2001) extension of Akaike's information criterion to the general-estimationequations probit quasi-likelihood function. By this measure, time independence in the error structure receives most support in every single location. We therefore choose ordinary probit estimates as our benchmark, but will also report labordemand elasticities under the alternative assumption of AR(2) disturbances in Section 4.4. Table 5 presents the probit results as marginal effects. Among the firm-level predictors, we include interactions between past presence indicators and wages to capture the co-determining effect of wage differentials and an MNE's past presence at a location. Past presence elsewhere (off the diagonal) has little predictive power, but past presence for the location itself is typically a statistically significant and 28 We use a general-estimation-equations probit estimator on repeated cross sections and distinguish between entry and exit sunk cost using past presence indicators as in (4), similar to Roberts and Tybout (1997) for exporting status. We do not attempt to uncover firm-specific sunk-cost components because fixed-effects probit estimation on panel data is known for problematic performance under a short time horizon (Heckman 1981 , Greene 2004 ). Hahn and Newey (2004) show that a panel jackknife or analytic correction can reduce bias if the time span grows at a rate faster than the cubic root of the number of panels, leading us to suspect that bias would remain for our four-year horizon and more than 2,000 MNEs.
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29 An AR(2) specification ranks between second and last in terms of the information criterion, depending on location, compared to independence, to an AR(1) and to a stationary two-year lag specification. salient predictor of presence (excepting OIN where the wage-presence interaction takes over). Indicators of past presence also control for permanent but unobserved MNE characteristics, such as lasting productivity or ownership advantages. When leaving interactions between wages and past presence out for a comparison, past presence at the same location has a highly statistically significant probability effect of .779 (standard error .022) in CEE, .671 (.027) in DEV, .713 (.026) in OIN, and .747 (.020) in WEU. The importance of past presence at the two-year horizon is consistent with hysteresis in location choice.
The home wage has the expected positive sign in all regressions and is a significant predictor for presence in OIN and WEU, both by itself and in its interaction with past presence. The negative coefficients on the interaction terms suggest that wage differentials matter less for the location decision of MNEs that already own an affiliate in the region. With home wages already controlling for the foreign-tohome wage differential, several foreign wages are statistically insignificant predictors. Insignificant coefficients of foreign wages are common in the literature on location choice (e.g. Devereux and Griffith (1998) for U.S., and Buch et al. (2005) for German MNEs). We only need home-wage coefficients for the cross elasticities of substitution at the extensive margin (there is no extensive margin for home where foreign wages would enter). Bootstraps over both estimation stages will show even for the statistically weak home-wage prediction of location selection into CEE that, weighted with the strong labor demand effects of CEE selection, the home wage significantly affects the elasticities of labor substitution at the extensive margin.
We include a large set of MNE and host-country specific predictors. Tests show MNE-level variables to be highly significant predictors of location choice with pvalues on the χ 2 statistics far below .001, while χ 2 tests on location-specific variables exhibit a mixed pattern with p values between .01 (DEV) and .64 (CEE). German MNEs with large home employment, low parent debt, and a high capital-labor ratio at the parent firm two years ago are significantly more likely to be present at most or all foreign locations. The MNE's number of host countries in the past significantly raises the likelihood of presence. Further covariates (not reported) include competitors' wages in OIN and WEU and their interactions with past presence in DEV and WEU, competitors' host-market access, competitors' host-country skill shares, competitors' host-country distance, competitors' host-country per-capita consumption, an indicator of parents' headquarters in West Germany, equity, and parent profits per equity. None of those latter covariates is significant at the five-percent level in any location. Results are robust to the inclusion of year dummies. To tentatively control for an outside margin of arm's length trade between independent firms, we also included a set of sector and location specific import and export measures but found the trade variables not to be significant predictors of location choice; here we leave them out.
We run the same regression as in Table 5 on the single cross section of MNEs in 2000 for a four-year horizon, using selection predictors in 1996. Results are broadly similar and suggest that cross-sectional variation in wages drives our results. We will report the according labor-demand cross elasticities in Section 4.4.
To gain a sense of sunk entry and exit costs behind hysteresis, we run a short descriptive regression of presence in the year-2000 cross section on past presence at the location and any other location in 1996. In this short descriptive regression, past presence is a highly significant predictor of presence four years later at the same location; presence elsewhere serves as a rudimentary control and is also highly statistically significant. These descriptive estimates provide an indication of sunk cost components in probability terms. Recall that the sunk cost part of location choice in eq. (4) can be represented as the difference between sunk entry costs and the hysteresis band. Table 6 shows the result of this decomposition based on coefficient estimates for the short descriptive regression.
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Past presence in a given location increases the likelihood of presence four years later by fifty percent in all but WEU, where the marginal effect predicts a more than forty percent increase. These estimates are lower than the around seventy-percent predictions at the two-year horizon (see above), but still substantial. The descriptive decomposition suggests that entry costs are largest in the distant low-income and high-income locations DEV and OIN, and dominate exit costs there. Conversely, entry costs are lowest in the nearby low-income and high-income locations CEE and WEU, and significantly smaller than exit costs. Among the exit costs are the opportunity costs of absence. German MNEs are considerably less reluctant to leave distant locations DEV and OIN than they abandon the neighboring locations CEE or WEU.
Nonparametric propensity score estimation. To break the curse of dimensionality in nonparametric estimation, we choose a polynomial approximation around seven core predictors, and linearly condition on the set of remaining firm and hostcountry variables. Among the seven core variables we include the wages in the five locations of interest as well as market access and the count of an MNE's past host countries (the latter being important predictors of location choice in prior research by Mayer 2004, Buch et al. 2005, e.g.) . We report results from third-order polynomials in the seven core variables because F tests show third-order polynomials in wages to outperform lower-order polynomials.
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Similar to probit estimation, we find the specification with independent disturbances to exhibit a better fit than specifications with serial correlation. Table 7 reports coefficient estimates by location. The predicted propensity scores of location choice are .338 for CEE, .291 for DEV, .262 for OIN and .617 for WEUslightly under-predicting the actual frequencies of presence in Table 4 but reflecting the relative frequencies across locations. Marginal effects are close to those in the probit regressions. Estimates of the hysteresis band along the diagonal of past presence indicators continue to have a magnitude similar to probit estimation. When leaving interactions between wages and past presence out, past presence at the same location has a highly statistically significant probability effect of .759 (standard error .018) in CEE, .668 (.020) in DEV, .711 (.017) in OIN, and .707 (.024) in WEU. Inclusion of wage interactions with past presence shifts much predictive power to the interaction terms in DEV and all predictive power to the interaction terms in OIN. In WEU, the interaction term countervails the high marginal effects of past presence. Table 7 presents F -tests of joint significance of individual wages for p values at or below the .1 threshold. Similar to probit estimation, polynomial terms that involve home wages predict location choice more successfully than most foreign wages (except OIN wages). Home wages are the predictors we need for cross elasticities at the extensive margin. Series terms involving the home sector wage predict selection into DEV and OIN at the five percent significance level. Significant parent-level covariates from probit estimation remain significant predictors under nonparametric estimation, excepting the host country count variable. Similarly, insignificant parent-level covariates remain insignificant. 31 Cross validation (pooling the MNE selection observations, removing and forecasting one at a time, and summing the squared forecast errors) lends slightly more support to a second-order polynomial in the core variables but the importance of wage predictors for elasticities prompts us to follow the F test results and use third-order polynomials. Ultimate elasticity estimates differ little. 
Labor demand estimation with selectivity correction
We proceed to estimate outcomes (8) y jt = x jt β + jt for all locations. For parametric correction, we include the predicted selectivity hazard (inverse of the Mills ratio) from the first stage among the regressors. Under nonparametric correction, we include the predicted propensity scores from the preferred first stage estimates; to choose the order of polynomial expansion at this stage, we test coefficients on propensity score terms up to third order. In both cases we also include absence indicators among the regressors to prevent stacking bias. We implement the second-stage estimation for all but one location (excluding home) by iterating Zellner's (1962) seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) over the estimated disturbance covariance matrix until the estimates converge. This is equivalent to maximum-likelihood estimation (Dhrymes 1971) and makes estimation invariant to the deleted location equation (Barten 1969) . Through constraints, we impose linear homogeneity in factor prices and symmetry of wage coefficients (see Appendix A). We treat induced heteroskedasticity following Heckman (1979) , resulting in different standard errors on symmetric coefficients. Table 8 presents estimates of translog cost function equations for 1,640 stacked MNE observations between 1998 and 2001. Beyond the reported wage coefficients, the equations include the full sets of turnover and fixed asset regressors, the scaled equivalent of the constant, and indicators of absence from all other locations. All but two wage coefficients in Table 8 are significantly different from zero at the one percent level, and all coefficients but one are significant at the five percent level in each, parametric and nonparametric, regression. Most coefficients on output and fixed assets (not reported) are similarly highly significant.
Equation estimates in the upper panel of Table 8 include the predicted selectivity hazards (inverses of Mills ratios) by location (Assumption 1). Selectivity hazards are statistically different from zero at the one percent level in all equations except DEV (significance at ten-percent level). The lower panel presents estimates from nonparametric selectivity correction (Assumption 2), using third-order polynomials in the location's propensity score interacted with indicators for presence at all other locations. χ 2 tests on the series terms overwhelmingly reject their joint equality to zero.
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The translog cost function regressors predict the bulk of labor demand variation across locations, with the R Elasticities of multinational labor substitution. We run 200 bootstraps over the joint selection (3) and outcome (8) estimation to infer elasticities of labor substitution (9) at both margins and their standard errors. Table 9 shows own-wage and cross-wage substitution elasticities for permanent wage changes by one percent in different locations, separately for the extensive and the intensive margins. There is no well-defined extensive margin for selection into the home location in a sample of MNEs that are observed only if active in the home location. One margin at a time is set to zero to isolate the effect at the other margin. While the plain log wage effects on wage bill shares are additive over the two margins, cross-wage substitution elasticities are not additive (eq. (8)).
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Own-wage elasticities along the diagonal-for both the intensive and the extensive margins-are uniformly and significantly negative, as production theory requires. While this might be expected for estimates at the intensive margin, it is a reassuring finding for estimates at the extensive margin. As is common, we impose linear homogeneity in factor prices and symmetry of wage coefficients at the intensive margin through constraints on the translog regression. But we do not restrict estimates at the extensive margin-neither under parametric nor nonparametric selectivity correction. The own-wage elasticity of substitution is considerably larger in most foreign locations than at home, suggesting that MNE employment abroad responds more sensitively to labor costs there than home employment responds to home wages.
Cross-wage elasticities in the first row (foreign wage effects on home employment) and in the first column (home wage effects on foreign employment) are significantly positive for eleven out of thirteen estimates at the intensive and the extensive margins. A one-percent reduction in the wage in CEE, for instance, is associated with a .05 percent drop in home employment at German MNE parents. In contrast, a onepercent increase in the German sector wage is associated with a 1.6 percent boost to MNE employment in CEE at the intensive margin and a .8 percent boost at the extensive margin. So, home and CEE employment are substitutes within MNEs. The large difference in cross-wage effects is consistent with two main facts. First, employment at German MNE parents is larger in levels than at their CEE affiliates so that a smaller percentage wage drop in Germany means a larger reduction in employment in absolute terms. Second, CEE workers tend to be less productive than German workers, which is reflected in the translog cost function coefficients.
The extensive margin is a noticeable component of adjustment, beyond its crucial role in correcting cost function estimates for location selectivity bias. Elasticities at the extensive margin are strictly positive. So, home and foreign employment are substitutes within MNEs not only at the intensive but also at the extensive margin. Although the CEE and DEV home wage effects on selection were not statistically different from zero on the first stage with probit (Table 5) , the strong significance of the selection effect on labor demand on the second stage in CEE (selectivity hazard coefficient in Table 8 ) turns home wage effects into significant predictors of employment substitution at the extensive margin.
Elasticities at the extensive margin are smaller in magnitude than at the intensive margin in the geographically close locations CEE and WEU, and in OIN. In DEV, however, the extensive margin dominates the insignificant elasticity at the intensive margin and we find a .8 percent increase in DEV employment in response to a one-percent home wage increase-similar in magnitude to that in CEE.
Our 200 bootstraps allow us to test whether the elasticities at the intensive margin are significantly different from the total elasticities. We reject their equality for DEV, OIN and WEU (with t statistics between 2.1 and 16.6) on unido wages and reject their equality for all locations (t statistics between 4.1 and 21.4) on oww wages, corroborating the importance of the extensive margin.
Cross-wage estimates beyond the first row and column are for the most part not statistically different from zero. Notable exceptions at the intensive margin are significant pairs of positive cross-wage effects involving WEU: on the one hand of OIN on WEU (.36) and vice versa (.90), and on the other hand of DEV on WEU (.05) and vice versa (.45). The significantly positive and mutually consistent effects suggest that MNE employment is a substitute at the intensive margin between OIN and WEU and between DEV and WEU. The substitution effect is also corroborated by a positive cross-wage elasticity between OIN and WEU (1.14) at the extensive margin.
Overall, our estimation strategy finds labor to be a substitute to labor in different locations. In the absence of a correction for the extensive margin, conventional translog estimates for the intensive margin in our data would result in over-estimated coefficients for ten out of 25 coefficients-a bias towards complementarity in these cases, but a bias towards even stronger substitutability in the remaining 15 cases. Following Harrison and McMillan (2006) , we also split the sample into MNEs in industries with no significant intra-firm trade (horizontal FDI) and with significant intra-firm trade (vertical FDI); we do not find home and foreign employment to be complements in any industry or location. 
Specification comparisons
To assess the robustness of our estimates, we compare several specifications and report the first rows of the cross-wage elasticity matrices (foreign wage effects on home employment) in Table 10 , and the first columns separately by intensive and extensive margin in Tables 11 and 12 (home wage effects on foreign employment).
Foreign-wage elasticities of home employment in Table 10 are robust across specifications. Estimates on our benchmark sample (first row) with unido wages and MNEs between 1998 and 2001 under Assumption 1 conform closely to several other specifications. The similarity between the 1998-2001 MNE sample and the single cross section of MNEs in 2000 (with location choice in 1996) in the second row is consistent with the view that cross sectional and not time series variation is the main source of identification at the intensive margin. The third row shows that an AR(2) error specification in the selection equation results in only minimal differences in cross-wage elasticity estimates. oww wage data in the fourth row lead to smaller estimation samples but coefficient estimates are similar across wage data.
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Nonparametric estimation does not yield statistically different estimates, neither under Assumption 2 nor 3, excepting DEV. The sample of 93 omnipresent MNEs between 1996 and 2001 is small but results in significant outcome estimates on the 34 We find similar results using ubs wage data. second stage; the magnitude of cross-wage elasticity estimates, when significant, is considerably larger than for the stacked samples, suggesting that home employment at omnipresent MNEs responds more elastically to foreign wage changes. Estimates for DEV are not significant except for nonparametric specifications. This is consistent with the assertion that higher-order series terms in the outcome regression help remove bias that parametric selectivity correction cannot prevent with a single selectivity hazard.
Home-wage elasticities of foreign employment at the intensive margin are robust too, as Table 11 shows. Estimates on our benchmark sample (now in the first column) conform closely to several other specifications. In fact, the comments on the rows of Table 10 above apply also to the columns of Table 11 , except only that the significant cross-wage elasticity estimates for the sample of omnipresent MNEs now closely resemble those from other specifications.
At the extensive margin, Table 12 documents that home-wage elasticities of foreign employment are (highly) significant in the parametric specifications (columns 1 through 4). Neither an AR(2) error specification for selection nor the use of oww wage data yield a significantly different elasticity estimate at any location. Under AR(2) selection disturbances, CEE and DEV point estimates increase while OIN and WEU point estimates drop (the latter to a level that is statistically indistinguishable from zero but also statistically indistinguishable from the benchmark).
With oww wage data, all elasticity point estimates but the one for CEE increase. Nonparametric estimates of elasticities at the extensive margin are sample means of the first derivatives of our third-order polynomial series expansions. We compute the elasticities after dropping those outlier predictions for which the first-stage probability model would result in propensity scores outside the zero-one range. Nonparametric estimates for the extensive margin (columns 5 and 6 of Table 12) are not statistically different from zero but similar in magnitude when plausible (column 5, excepting DEV). Although the inclusion of nonparametric series terms in labor demand estimation yields more precise estimates of intensive margin coefficients (Tables 10 and 11 before), the series terms do not seem to provide a precise estimate of the extensive margin itself. The similarity between parametric and plausible nonparametric estimates is nevertheless an indication that our parametric benchmark estimates of the extensive margin are reasonable. Point estimates for omnipresent MNEs (column 7) are smaller than in the benchmark specification, arguably because this selected sample expands to foreign locations more frequently.
In summary, robustness checks confirm the statistical plausibility of the benchmark estimates in Table 9 under parametric selectivity correction (Assumption 1). Nonparametric estimates are similar and highly significant at the intensive margin, but fail to attain statistical significance at the extensive margin. We now turn to the economic importance of our estimates for multinational labor substitution.
Counterfactual evaluation
Our hypothetical experiment is a permanent change in the wage differential between home and foreign locations. How much larger would parent employment be if the wage gap to foreign locations narrowed? How much smaller would affiliate employment be? Counterfactual predictions in Table 13 give answers to these questions.
We use the home-wage elasticities of foreign employment and the foreign-wage elasticities of home employment from benchmark estimates in Table 9 . These estimates reflect the mean MNE's labor-demand response (the mean MNE in the stacked sample has propensities of presence abroad as in the first row of Table 4 ). We multiply the elasticity estimates with the workforce totals in Table 1 and obtain the implied employment changes from one-percent increases in wages by margin.
A one percent smaller wage gap between Germany and locations in CEE, for instance, is associated with around 700 more jobs at German parents and 4,000 less jobs at affiliates in CEE. CEE affiliates tend to have smaller work forces and, arguably, lower labor productivity than German establishments so that employment in CEE is more sensitive to home wage changes than home employment responds to foreign wages. The labor substitution effects of one-percent wage changes between home locations and CEE are smaller than the effects relative to OIN or WEU. In absolute magnitude, however, a closing of the HOM-CEE wage gap by half at constant elasticities results in larger employment effects than a reduction of the HOM-OIN or HOM-WEU wage gaps by half. Using country populations as weights for location mean unido wages, CEE wages are, on average, 9.9 percent of the German level in 2000 (population-weighted mean oww wages in CEE are 9.8 percent). If the estimated elasticities of substitution are constant at all levels of wages, an increase in CEE wages by 450%(= [(1−.099)/2]/.099) to reduce the wage gap visà vis Germany by half would bring 330,000 (= 730 · 450) counterfactual manufacturing jobs (with a standard error of 45,000 jobs) to Germany-around a quarter of the estimated home employment at German manufacturing MNEs (Table 1) . If international wage gaps shrink at a similar rate as per capita GDP converges to steady state and Germany is close to its steady state, the CEE-German wage gap would take around 35 years to contract to half its present size (Barro and Sala i Martin 1992) . The unido wage level in WEU is 78.6 percent of that in Germany so that an increase in WEU wages by 14% to cut the gap by about half would attract 70,000 counterfactual manufacturing jobs to the German plants of German manufacturing MNEs. Elasticities of labor substitution are local properties of the MNE's cost function, however, and the assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution at all wage levels is coarse. The rough calculations above are merely intended to put an economic meaning to the abstract elasticity figures. In our view, the magnitude of our calculations for constant elasticities nonetheless underscores the potential importance of job substitution within MNEs for labor market outcomes.
Conclusion
While the public discourse over outsourcing seems to have settled on the idea that multinational enterprises (MNEs) substitute jobs at home for foreign employment, economic studies on MNE labor demand across locations have found weak or no evidence of job substitution. We integrate two distinct branches of the literatureone on predictions of MNEs' location choices, and one on labor substitutability across established MNE locations-into a single econometric model that corrects labor-demand estimation for location selectivity. In our framework, multinational labor demand responds to wage differentials across locations both at the extensive margin, when an MNE expands into foreign locations, and at the intensive margin, when an MNE reallocates jobs across existing foreign affiliates. We derive conditions for common Heckman (1979) selectivity corrections, location by location, and for nonparametric identification.
Empirical evidence on German manufacturing MNEs shows that firms change multinational presence only infrequently and hardly alter their number of affiliates within regions. These scant changes to multinational presence at the extensive margin are associated with salient labor demand effects in response to permanent wage differentials across locations. With every percentage increase in Central and Eastern European wages, for instance, German manufacturing MNEs are found to allocate 700 MNE jobs to Germany. Similarly, with every percentage increase in German wages, German MNEs allocate 2,000 jobs to Central and Eastern Europe at the extensive margin and 4,000 jobs in total. Given the sizeable wage differential between Germany and Central and Eastern Europe (requiring a 450 percent increase in Eastern European wages in 2000 to reduce the gap by half), we conclude that international wage differentials have a pronounced impact on multinational labor substitution.
Appendix A Multiproduct translog cost function
Consider the short-run multiproduct translog function with quasi-fixed capital:
By Shepard's lemma, MNE j's demand for employment y jt is equal to ∂C/∂w t so that the wage bill share s jt ≡ w t y jt /C at location becomes
We transform these L equations into L simultaneous labor demand functions by multiplying the dependent variable and all regressors with the observation-specific scalars C/w t and obtain y jt = ∂C/∂w t = s jt C/w t as in eq. (8).
With L locations, there are L(L−1)/2 symmetry restrictions δ k = δ k for any k, . Linear homogeneity in factor prices requires that
We impose these restrictions on intensive-margin estimation but do not constrain extensive-margin coefficients. We do not impose any returns-to-scale restrictions.
B Nonparametric selection correction
To establish identification, consider deviations from the truth ∆ξ (x jt ) ≡ x jt (β −β ) and ∆m (Pr jt 
, where hats denote estimates of the true (not hatted) functions.
Assumption 2 formally states one set of sufficient conditions for identification.
Assumption 2
(iii) ∇ z j,t−τ Pr jt = 0 with probability one,
Part (i) requires that the conditional expectation of the labor demand disturbance at location is only a function of the propensity score of presence at and observed presence elsewhere, as in (5). So, in the regression of observed labor demand y jt on x jt β and m (Pr jt , d k = jt ), x jt β is a separate additive component. This specification extends nonparametric selectivity correction with a single outcome equation (but multiple selection thresholds) in Das et al. (2003) to the multivariate outcome case.
Part (ii) is the same identification condition as in Das et al. (2003) and implies that Pr jt (which enters m (Pr jt , d jt ) indeterminate-a violation of (ii). In our context, parent-firm characteristics and competitor-level host-country characteristics are among the z j,t−τ predictors of presence but not related to the labor-specific part of the cost function other than through wages themselves. The rank condition (iii) requires that the information set z j,t−τ predicts the propensity score. Then lemma 3 follows as a corollary to Lemma 2, replacing the scalar derivative ∂∆m (Pr jt , d k = jt )/∂Pr jt with the vector ∇ P jt ∆m (P jt ), and replacing ∇ z j,t−τ P jt with ∇ z j,t−τ P jt .
Lemma 3 
D Data
D.1 Currency conversion and deflation
We deflate parent variables with the German CPI and deflate affiliate variables with country-level CPIs (from the IMF's International Financial Statistics).
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CPI deflation factors are re-based to unity at year end 1998. We transform foreign currency values to their EUR equivalents in December 1998 in order to remove nominal exchange rate fluctuations. December 1998 is the mid point in time for our 1996-2001 sample. Introduction of the euro in early 1999 makes December 1998 a natural reference date.
In BuBa's original midi data, all information on foreign affiliates is reported in German currency using the exchange rate at the closing date of the foreign affiliate's balance sheet. We apply the following conversion to all financial variables. Deutschmark (DEM) figures are transformed into EUR at the rate 1/1.95583 (the conversion rate at euro inception in 1999). (i) We use the market exchange rate on the end-of-month day closest to an affiliate's balance sheet closing date to convert the DEM or EUR figures into local currency for every affiliate. This reverses the conversion applied to the questionnaires at the date of reporting. (ii) A CPI factor for every country deflates the foreign-currency financial figures to the December-1998 real value in local currency. (iii) For each country, the average of all end-of-month exchange rates vis-à-vis the DEM or EUR between January 1996 and December 2001 is used as a proxy for purchasing power parity of foreign consumption baskets relative to the DEM or EUR. All deflated local-currency figures are converted back to DEM or EUR using this purchasing-power proxy.
D.2 Wages
Our main estimation sample uses sectoral manufacturing wages by country between 1996 and 2001 from the unido Industrial Statistics Database at the 3-digit ISIC level, Rev. 2 (UNIDO 2005). The unido measure of annual sectoral wage bills includes all payments to workers at establishments in the reference sector and year (wages and salaries, remuneration for time not worked, bonuses and gratuities, allowances, and payments in kind; but excludes contributions to social security, pensions, insurance, severance and termination pay). We divide the sectoral wage bill by the sectoral number of workers and employees. The unido data cover 109 countries and result in the largest overlap with midi observations on German MNEs for estimation.
For robustness checks, we use oww monthly average wage rates of male workers at the country level for 161 occupations in 155 countries between 1983 and 1999. Missing observations, however, reduce the overlap with midi data on German MNEs below the overlap that unido data provide. We follow Freeman and Oostendorp's (2001) recommendation and pick the base calibration with lexicographic weighting for the aggregate wages by country. We fill missing values, by country and occupation group, with information from the latest preceding year that has wage information available and reuse oww wages from 1999 in 2000 and 2001. To mitigate workforce composition effects, we take country medians over 161 oww occupation groups for foreign wages. We multiply the resulting monthly median occupation wage by twelve to approximate annual earnings for cost function estimation. Complementing foreign oww wages, we use the German annual earnings survey (table 62321 from destatis.de/genesis) and obtain sectoral monthly wages, broken down into three blue-collar and four white-collar occupation groups by sector (two-digit NACE 1.1). We compute median wages over these seven occupation groups by sector. Occupational wage information from the German annual earnings survey enters the ILO database, on which oww wages are based, so that these foreign and domestic wages are compatible.
D.3 Complementary data
Host-country characteristics. National accounts information for host-country regressors comes from the World Bank's World Development Indicators and the IMF's International Financial Statistics. To condition selection estimation on skill endowments beyond labor costs, we include the host country's percentage of highschool or higher educated residents in 1999 from Barro and Lee (2001) and interact the variable with an indicator whether the percentage exceeds that in Germany (19.5%).
Bilateral market access. We construct market access measures following Redding and Venables (2004) . We obtain bilateral trade data for 1996 through 2001 and geographic information on country pairs from cepii (www.cepii.fr ). After filling in missing imports to B from A with exports information from country A to B, we drop all exports information and set exports from A to B equal to B's imports from A. We adopt this procedure because we consider imports, whenever available, more reliably measured than exports.
Our regression specification for an unbalanced panel of country pairs by year is
where X ij denotes country i's aggregate exports in USD (+1) to country j, x i an exporter country dummy, m j an importer country dummy, d ij the geographical distance between country i and j, and b ij a dummy variable indicating a common border. We compute market access A i to country i as
This is measure MA(3) in Redding and Venables (2004) . 
